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LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. By Durga Das Basu. 
Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons (Private) Ltd. 1972. Pp. xx.vi, 575. 
For those who have at least a passing acquaintance with Indian 
constitutional literature, Dr. Basu needs no introduction. He ranks 
as one of the leading authorities on the Indian Constitution and the 
whole of Indian constitutional law. His writings have not only been 
influential in systematizing the body of Indian constitutional law but 
have also had an important impact on the course of decisions in that 
area. His pioneer commentary on the Constitution of India was it-
self an extraordinary work of seminal importance.1 While he has 
distinguished himself as an academician, his experience in the field 
of public law has been very rich and extensive. He has served as a 
member of the Law Commission of India, a judge of the High Court 
of Calcutta, Dean and a member of the Faculty of Law at Calcutta 
University, and, more recently, Tagore Law Professor at the Univer-
sity of Calcutta. The book under review is based on the Tagore Law 
Lectures, delivered by the author at the University of Calcutta in 
1968-1969. 
This volume can be said to be a distillate of Dr. Basu's ripe schol-
arship, insights, and wisdom on the general subject of constitutional-
ism. It is an interesting and skillful amalgam of several features. In 
the first place, the author is intent on demonstrating a universality 
of ideas concerning limited government and its necessary adjunct, 
judicial review; in doing so, he draws upon his wide learning to 
present each matter in its comparative aspects. Recognizing the dis-
tinctive contributions made by American constitutional theory and 
practice to the concept of limited government and to the role that 
judicial review plays in giving flesh and blood to the written docu-
ment, he draws heavily on constitutional development in the United 
States. His expertise in and knowledge of American constitutional 
law and the course of American decisions is, indeed, impressive. He 
also draws heavily on English constitutional practice to contrast sys-
tems that recognize an unlimited parliamentary power with those 
that recognize that Parliament, as well as other organs of government, 
is subject to a constitution interpreted by the courts. The book is 
valuable alone for its comparative aspect. 
The volume also affords very valuable insights into, and in this 
sense is a limited commentary on, judicial interpretation of the In-
dian Constitution. The author reveals his extraordinary intimacy 
l, D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNSI'lTUTION OF INDIA (5th ed. 1965), 
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with the decisions of the Supreme Court of India and also his great 
skill in analysis of cases, synthesis of materials, and formulation of 
doctrine. Dr. Basu is always forthright and clear in stating his ideas 
and does not hesitate to condemn what he regards as erroneous views 
or holdings by the Court. 
In these lectures Dr. Basu is not primarily concerned with the sys-
tematic exposition of constitutional law; rather, he is interested in 
the significance of the decisions of the Supreme Court of India for 
basic constitutional concepts. The book is a treatise that transcends 
empiric study of judicial interpretation and penetrates to what Dr. 
Basu considers to be fundamental ideas with respect to human so-
ciety and the nature of government, the idea of limited government, 
the concepts of natural law and natural right, and the source of con-
stituent power in a constitutional system. In this book Dr. Basu re-
veals himself to be not only a distinguished commentator on the 
Indian Constitution and a scholar greatly versed in the bodies of 
decisional law in various countries, but also a thoughtful jurist and 
legal philosopher. 
A word may be said about Dr. Basu's method, which I have de-
scribed as comparative in character. Perhaps he has given us a clue 
to what may really be the most effective way in which to treat mate-
rials comparatively-that is, by centering on the constitutional struc-
ture and interpretations of one particular country, but analysing and 
appraising them in the light of developments under other systems. 
The reader emerges with a very good picture of the Indian constitu-
tional system as it is related to other systems and of the extent to 
which it has built on the American system in particular; at the same 
time, the reader gains a clear understanding of the difference benv-een 
a system of limited government reinforced by judicial review, like 
the system found in India, and the unlimited parliamentary power 
of the English system. The book may well suggest a pattern for com-
parative treatment in other areas. 
Within the limited scope of this book review it is not possible to 
do full justice to the work. At most one can attempt to portray the 
general theme of the several lectures and point out some particularly 
interesting ideas as they relate to a comparison between the Indian 
and American constitutional systems. 
In the first lecture, with its intriguing title, "The Correct Ap-
proach" (pp. 1-43), the author sets forth some threshold ideas, which 
he regards as particularly important for his Indian readers. At the 
outset he makes the point that the Indian courts should make no 
apology for drawing on American experience and decisions in inter-
preting provisions of ~e Indian Constitution, since the underlying 
philosophy and many express features of the Indian Constitution 
are based on the .American experience-notably, of course, the ide~ 
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of judicial review, the federal structure, and the enumeration of 
fundamental rights. 
It is evident that the author has a devotion to constitutionalism, 
judicial review, and the idea of limited government, as well as a very 
high respect for the Indian Constitution in particular, and he ex• 
presses regret that this respect is apparently not shared by all of his 
fellow citizens. He is disturbed by the relative ease with which the 
Indian Constitution is amended and by the fact that it has been 
amended so frequently during its relatively short history, as com-
pared with the less frequent amendments of the United States Consti-
tion over a longer period of time. He admonishes his fellow citizens 
to respect the courts as guardians of the Constitution. He suggests 
alternative methods for selecting judges and notes the importance of 
paying adequate judicial salaries to attract to the bench persons with 
the superior ability necessary for dealing with constitutional ques-
tions. 
In the next chapter, "The Problem of Power and Need for Limi-
tations" (pp. 44-68), the author gets to the heart of the basic ideas that 
he intends to develop. The problem is one of limiting governmental 
power. Pointing out that the experience in England merely transfer-
red power from a "single-headed Leviathan to a hydra-headed un-
crowned Leviathan" (p. 44), namely, the Parliament, he says that 
even a representative legislature is capable of abusing its power. 
Judicial review is also necessary because legislative bodies, as well as 
executive agencies, are capable of arbitrary and ruthless action at the 
expense of the liberties of the people, and it is not an answer simply 
to say that abuse of power by the legislature can be corrected by 
throwing the rascals out at the next election. The reader becomes 
aware early in the book that the author has strong convictions about 
judicial review and that there is not the least bit of doubt in his mind 
that judicial review is a good thing. He accepts the American ideas 
that the constitution is fundamental law, that as fundamental law it 
ranks superior to all other laws, and that in the end the judiciary's 
peculiar function is to interpret the constitution and therefore give 
it the final authoritative exposition. He does not see this as a violation 
of the principle of separation of powers or as a betrayal of the demo-
cratic system. In India it is unnecessary to engage in extended argu-
ments in support of judicial review, since the Indian Constitution 
makes it clear that the courts are intended to exercise that function 
and that any law that is found to be in violation of the Constitution 
is void. 
In the third lecture, "The Written Constitution as a Limitation° 
(pp. 69-149), the author builds on ideas developed in the second lec-
ture and, to some extent, anticipates ideas developed again in a later 
lecture on fundamental rights. He here develops the thesis of the 
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·written constitution as a superior law and, in tum, traces the con-
cept of a superior law to its basic roots in what he regards as universal 
natural-law theories. While the main emphasis in this lecture is on 
the idea that the ·written constitution is a legal document that re-
quires authoritative exposition by a judicial tribunal, the author also 
develops some limitations on judicial review, notably with respect 
to so-called nonjusticiable problems. His treatment of nonjusticiabil-
ity follows from the point, which he emphasizes, that the courts of 
India have no general power to declare legislation invalid but possess 
only a power to deal with constitutional questions in the course of 
justiciable controversies coming before the' courts. A major part of 
the chapter consists of a very useful review of the kinds of questions 
that are non justiciable under the Indian Constitution, eiili:er because 
of express indication in the Constitution that the final determination 
of the question is reserved to other branches of the government or 
because nonjusticiability is implicit in the very nature of the prob-
lem. 
In the fourth lecture, "Fundamental Rights as a Limitation" (pp. 
150-215), the author gets to what is probably a favorite theme-that 
a principal function of a constitution is to protect the rights of a per-
son against the arbitrary exercise of power. In his view, the whole 
concept of fundamental rights flows from basic natural-rights theories. 
He credits Blackstone for importing the doctrine of natural rights 
from the realm of political philosophy into the realm of jurispru-
dence, traces the early development of the natural-rights theory in 
American constitutional thought, and observes that even after the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution-a 
development that could be viewed as a positive incorporation of natu-
ral rights--the doctrines of natural law and natural rights continued 
to wield a potent force in the judicial protection of individual rights. 
This discussion leads Dr. Basu to the question of whether a specific 
constitutional formulation of certain rights excludes the judicial 
recognition of other rights. In this connection, he relies on American 
experience to support the idea, formally expressed in the ninth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, that the express enun-
ciation of some rights does not exclude others, which are retained 
by the people. Thus, he points to the recognition by the United States 
Supreme Court of the freedom of association,2 the right to educate 
a child in nonpublic schools of the parents' choice,3 and the right of 
privacy.4 (I£ the book had been ·written later, Dr. Basu could have 
referred to the recent abortion decisions by the Supreme Court5 as 
2. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
3. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
4. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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a further development of the right of privacy.) At this point the 
author engages in a critical discussion of the Indian decisions inter-
preting article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which provides that 
no person "shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law." Pointing out that the 
earlier Indian decisions gave a very restricted interpretation to article 
21, Dr. Basu is happy with later cases that have construed it more 
broadly and have used it in a way very similar to that in which the 
due process clause in the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution has been used to protect substantive liberty and as a 
basis for rights related to those expressly enunciated. He advances 
the thesis that various aspects of privacy as developed in American 
decisions could be developed under article 21 of the Indian Consti-
tution, although he recognizes that, at least under some of the past 
decisions of the Indian Court, the reasonableness of any restriction 
could not be questioned. 
The fifth lecture, "Due Process Under the Constitution of India" 
(pp. 216-74), is of particular interest to American readers because of 
the extraordinary history of interpretation of the American due 
process clause, particularly after the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment. In American constitutional doctrine, due process not 
only refers to procedural regularity but has also come to have a sub-
stantive content in that it operates as a restraint on the arbitrary 
exercise of power. The drafters of the Indian Constitution carefully 
avoided using the "due process of law" language in their Constitution 
and instead provided in article 21 that no person should be "deprived 
of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure estab-
lished by law." On their face, these words have reference only to pro-
cedural due process, and Dr. Basu acknowledges this. However, he 
points out that the opportunity was open to the Indian courts to de-
velop the basic concept of substantive due process in interpreting 
other provisions of the Constitution. The Indian Court has, in fact, 
done this, so that while there is no formal due process clause and no 
formal acceptance of the idea that the Court is free to write new 
conceptions of fundamental rights into the Constitution by use of 
due process language, a process that has been much criticized in 
American jurisprudence, the Court has nevertheless borrowed the 
basic notion that power must be exercised in only a limited way un• 
less the constitutional language makes clear that the legislative power 
is to be free from any restriction of reasonableness. 
It is in this connection that Dr. Basu discusses the American no-
tion of the police power, which he says was invented by American 
courts to reconcile the differences between liberty, on the one hand, 
and the need for legislation to secure important public objectives, 
on the other. Dr. Basu maintains that, although there is no formal ac-
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ceptance of the idea in India, by its interpretation of "reasonable-
ness," the Indian Court has, in effect, also used police power thinking. 
Even with his enthusiasm for judicial review and for the power 
of the court to declare invalid legislation that it finds to be unreason-
able or arbitrary, Dr. Basu still takes pause when he considers the 
decisions by the Indian Supreme Court in the field of legislation pro-
viding for the expropriation of property. He is particularly disturbed 
by the Bank Nationalization Case,6 in which he found that the Su-
preme Court of India in effect incorporated tµe whole notion of sub-
stantive due process as a limitation on the eminent domain power. 
He thinks that in this situation the Indian Court carried substantive 
due process even further than the American courts, and he is not 
happy about this. Noting that the United States Supreme Court has, 
for all practical purposes, abandoned substantive due process in the 
protection of property and economic rights and kept it intact only 
with respect to the protection of other rights, Dr. Basu recognizes 
that the Indian Constitution leaves no place for the idea of preferred 
rights or for distinctions between the degrees of judicial protection 
accorded the various rights explicitly protected by the Constitution. 
After all that is ·written in prior chapters, the separate chapter on 
"Judicial Review" (Lecture VI, pp. 275-348) simply seems to repeat 
what has been said earlier, and, in part, it does. The author points 
out the differences between the American system, where judicial re-
view is implied from the nature of the constitution as superior law 
and the function of the Court to interpret the law, and the Indian 
situation, where judicial review is expressly recognized and the power 
of the Court to declare legislation void is made explicit in the Consti-
tution. In spite of this explicit recognition of the doctrine, the author 
finds it useful to present arguments in favor of judicial review both 
to justify its inclusion in the Constitution and to support a vigorous 
exercise of the power. He takes the occasion here to point out that 
the Court, in exercising judicial review, should deal only with the 
express language of the Constitution and should not include certain 
a priori assumptions that may distort constitutional interpretation. 
Thus, he questions the wisdom of incorporating the ideas developed 
by the United States Supreme Court in applying the supremacy clause 
to invalidate state legislation found to impinge on interstate com-
merce, since the situation in India, where concurrent powers are ex-
pressly recognized in the Constitution, is quite different. He also 
warns against reading into the constitutional section on expropriation 
of property the idea of just compensation found in the American 
Constitution, since the property provision in the Indian Constitution 
was addressed to a totally different situation. Despite parliamentary 
efforts through constitutional amendment to make it clear that the 
6. Cooper v. Union of India, All India R, 1970 S. Ct. 564, 
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courts are not to question the compensation formula, the Indian 
Supreme Court has continued to adhere to the idea that "compensa-
tion" as used in the Indian Constitution means "just compensation" 
in accordance with the American idea. In Dr. Basu's view this is a 
limitation that the Indian Supreme Court has mistakenly written 
into the Constitution. 
In the seventh lecture, "Interpretation of a Constitution" (pp. 
349-422), the author emphasizes the necessity of interpreting a consti-
tution as a constitution and not as a statutory instrument, and he 
points to what he regards as weaknesses in the perspectives brought 
to constitutional interpretation by the Privy Council and the Cana-
dian Supreme Court. He notes that the experience of Indian judges, 
"trained in deciding cases on private law, while interpreting the Con-
stitution with its Bill of Rights and avenues of Judicial Review, has 
in some cases, been similar to that of the Privy Councillors dealing 
·with constitutional questions coming from the Dominions" (p. 362). 
It took some time for the Indian Supreme Court to realize that there 
was something wrong in the cautious attitude toward judicial power 
expressed in Gopalan v. Madras.7 The Supreme Court of India has 
now proceeded to the point of interpreting the term "personal lib-
erty" in article 21 of the Constitution as broadly as the word "liberty" 
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Consti-
tution is understood by the United States Supreme Court. Dr. Basu 
points out how, in other respects, the Court has expressed its realiza-
tion that an exclusively legalistic and textual interpretation would 
do injustice to the Constitution. Interpretation must be progressive, 
not static. Because of the gr~at detail of the Indian Constitution, 
there is less room for the kind of extensive and progressive interpre-
tation that has taken place under the broader and more indeterminate 
language of the United States Constitution. Moreover, since the pro-
cess of amending the Indian Constitution is easy, progressive judicial 
interpretation is not nearly as important in India as it is under the 
United States Constitution. Dr. Basu points out that the Indian 
Constitution does contain some general terms that can be given either 
expanded or narrow construction. 
The important questions of "Effects of Unconstitutionality and 
Prospective Overruling" are examined in the eighth lecture (pp. 423-
97). Express provisions of the Indian Constitution make it clear that 
a declaration by the Supreme Court that a statute is unconstitutional 
invalidates the statute and that this decision is binding on all other 
courts; in a very real sense, the Indian decision operates in rem on a 
statute, whereas the American decision operates only in personam 
between the parties, and any further unenforceability of a statute de-
pends upon the doctrine of precedent rather than upon any notion 
that the statute is no longer in effect. Dr. Basu is skeptical of the 
7. All India R. 1950 S. Ct. 27. 
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American doctrine, developed in Linkletter v. Walker,8 that a de-
cision announcing a new rule of constitutional law may, depending 
on the circumstances, be given prospective effect only. He feels that 
this result is impossible under the Indian Constitution and that, in 
any event, the doctrine is undesirable and a distortion of the concept 
of judicial review. One need not accept all of Dr. Basu's criticisms. 
Quite clearly, the possible consequences of making a new procedural 
decision retroactive so as to give the benefit of collateral attack to 
prisoners in jail, which could result in wholesale voiding of convic-
tions and the impossibility of conducting new trials because of the 
staleness of evidence, are very important, and a court need not close 
its eyes to these policy considerations in exercising its power of re-
view. 
In the ninth, and final, chapter, the author discusses "Amend-
ability of the Constitution and Judicial Review of Amendment Acts" 
(pp. 498-559). Dr. Basu quite rightly closes the book with a lecture 
on the amendment process, a factor not always fully appreciated in 
discussions of judicial review, although the whole significance of ju-
dicial review depends on the rigidity of the amendment process. If 
the amendment process is laborious, a court may feel an obligation 
to keep the constitution up to date by assuming an activist role, 
whereas a court in a country where the amendment process is fairly 
easy can take a more relaxed attitude and be content to follow prece-
dent much more closely. The author clearly articulates the difference 
between legislative power and what he calls the constitutive power, 
that is, the basic power on which the constitution rests. Dr. Basu re-
jects the idea that the constitutive power can be asserted by the peo-
ple only through a revolution outside the formal process. Amendment 
procedures may be more or less flexible. In a constitution, the peo-
ple, who are the source of constitutive power, may provide that the 
power resides elsewhere for amendment purposes, or they may pro-
vide for an amendment process in which they play a part through 
referendum. The Indian procedure is quite flexible, since it requires 
no referendum, but only a special majority vote of both houses of 
the legislature. The author is critical of the decision in ·colak Nath 
v. Punjab,0 in which the Indian Supreme Coµ.rt held that any amend-
ment impinging upon fundamental rights must be enacted in the 
same way that the original Constitution was enacted, namely, by a 
constituent assembly, rather than by the regular amendment process 
expressly provided for in the Constitution. In Dr. Basu's view, this 
decision is clearly ·wrong. He makes the point, and I think correctly, 
that when a constitution prescribes its own procedure for amendment, 
this procedure governs, and courts are not competent either to chal-
lenge it or to insist on other methods; certainly they should not find 
8. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
9, [1967] 2 India S. Ct. 762, All India R. 1967 S. Ct. 1643. 
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some implicit limitation on the amendment process over and above 
that stated in the constitution. This chapter is in itself very helpful 
and illuminating, and it deserves wide reading. 
In this volume, rich in its scholarship and understanding, Dr. 
Basu has made a highly valuable contribution to the literature deal-
ing with limited government and judicial review. It should take its 
place with other comparative treatments of these matters.1° For the 
uninitiated, it is an excellent introduction to Indian constitutional-
ism and the role of the Indian Supreme Court in exercising its power 
of review. Any treatment of these questions is of special interest to 
American lawyers, jurists, and scholars, since the subject of judicial 
review and the role of the United States Supreme Court, whether 
activist or nonactivist, continues to be a matter of debate and discus-
sion. Dr. Basu makes no new arguments in defense of judicial review, 
and some American students of the subject, while accepting his con-
clusion, may not accept all of his premises. But he presents a per-
suasive case and does so with conviction and enthusiasm. After long 
experience, Americans have become alive to the perils of judicial 
review and the danger that a court carried away by its own zeal may 
assume a superlegislative role and intrude into areas reserved for de-
termination by the elected legislature and the people themselves. 
American readers may not, therefore, completely share Dr. Basu's 
strong support of a vigorous exercise of the judicial review power, 
but it should be noted that the Supreme Court of India faced the 
problem of developing a sense of confidence and resoluteness in ex-
ercising a power that was expressly given to it. Scholars like Dr. Basu 
perform a great service in bringing the support of history, philoso-
phy, and the experience of other countries to the defense of judicial 
review and in urging a vigorous use of that power. One gets the im-
pression that Dr. Basu feels that the Supreme Court of India has 
come a long way in discharging the function with which it was en-
trusted and that, on the whole, it has charted a good course. Never-
theless, the Court is vulnerable in some of its interpretations, and 
Dr. Basu is expert in probing the Court's decisions and in pointing 
out what he regards as errors and weaknesses. 
Dr. Basu has earned a place as the foremost scholar in Indian con-
stitutional law. In this volume he enhances this reputation and 
emerges also as a distinguished comparative scholar. 
Paul G. Kauper, 
Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, 
The University of Michigan 
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